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In 1986, Professor Jeffrey O'Connell and I recommended giving
motorists a choice between fault and no-fault insurance.' We saw
advantages in allowing individual motorists to choose either (1) in-
surance that pays for a tort lawsuit remedy, or (2) insurance that
pays for a contract no-lawsuit remedy:
[A choice system] will permit consumers to decide ... for themselves
[what kind of auto insurance they want] rather than surrendering the deci-
sion to politicians in the state legislature. Those who prefer traditional in-
surance and who value the right to sue can purchase traditional liability
insurance, and those who desire coverage providing timely compensation
without resort to a lawsuit can purchase no-fault insurance. The proposal
will enhance efficiency by expanding the range of consumer choice and by
creating competition between two systems in the marketplace.2
We developed a system in our article3 which we said would permit
consumers to decide for themselves whether they wanted to purchase
tort liability insurance or contract no-fault insurance. The system
* B.A. 1957, Yale University; J.D. 1968, Harvard University. The author has been
involved with issues of compensation of auto accident victims since 1962. He has served
as a staff assistant to the organization that is now known as the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (ATLA), as legislative counsel to the United States Senate Com-
merce Committee, and as a consultant to the United States Department of Transporta-
tion. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those
of any of the organizations by which he has been employed.
1. O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault
Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61 (1986).
2. Id. at 89.
3. The motivation to develop such a system came in part from the following fed-
eral government recommendation: "In the opinion of the Department, additional volun-
tary or choice systems deserve to be developed and tried." U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COM-
PENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO
INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 124 (1985).
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would accommodate the simultaneous use of both kinds of auto in-
surance and would, therefore, be workable. It would allow tort liabil-
ity (a third party remedy) to co-exist with contract no-fault compen-
sation' (a first party remedy). The key to its workability was a new
form of supplemental insurance that would be made a part of each
liability policy, and that would "connect" the third party and the
first party systems, making the two kinds of insurance compatible,
and assuring that each was priced competitively. Each person cov-
ered by insurance under either system (an "insured") would be com-
pensated from the financial resources of that system alone.'
At the time, only one state, Kentucky, had enacted an auto insur-
ance law under which motorists could choose for themselves whether
they wanted to be covered by no-fault insurance or by tort liability
insurance. Since the article was published, choice in auto insurance
laws have been enacted in two additional states: New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. In 1988, New Jersey enacted amendments to its auto
insurance law that gave motorists a choice between a full lawsuit
system and a no-lawsuit (except for serious injuries) system., In
1990, Pennsylvania enacted a law that gives all motorists a choice,
effective July 1, 1990, between a limited tort option and a full tort
option.7
There has been a significant amount of recent legislative activity
in other states as well. In 1989, bills permitting choice in auto insur-
ance were introduced in the legislatures of seven other states: Ari-
4. In this article, the terms "no-lawsuit," "no-fault," and "compensation" are all
used to designate an insurance system that compensates accident victims without a law-
suit and without regard to fault. The term preferred by the author to designate such a
system is "compensation" because that term is better known in all fifty states and more
accurate. All fifty states have laws with respect to industrial accidents that compensate
victims without a lawsuit and without regard to fault. They are uniformly called work-
men's or worker's compensation laws, rather than workmen's or worker's no-fault laws.
Less than half the states have such laws with respect to automobile accidents. The term
"no-fault" is less accurate than the term "compensation" because it suggests that a per-
son who is at fault will not be sanctioned. This suggestion is incorrect since most insurers
increase the premiums charged motorists (and employers) who are at fault in causing or
contributing to an accident.
5. The liability insured would recover only from the pool of money created by the
collection of premiums from liability insureds, and the no-fault compensation insured
would recover benefits only from the pool created by the collection of premiums from no-
fault compensation insureds. The liability insured would recover full (economic and
noneconomic loss) damages (1) from another liability insured upon proof that such per-
son was at fault and responsible for his or her injury or (2) from the connector coverage
under his or her own liability policy, upon proof that a no-fault compensation insured
was at fault and responsible for the injury. The no-fault compensation insured would
recover economic loss damages from his or her own insurer without having to prove fault.
6. For details of the New Jersey choice system, see infra text accompanying notes
38-40.
7. Act of Feb. 7, 1990, § 8 (adding 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1705(a)(1),
1791.1(b)).
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zona,8 California,9 Delaware,' ° Hawaii," Maryland, 2 Nevada,' 3 and
Washington.14 Many of these states, and one Canadian province,15
took significant action on the concept of choice in auto insurance. A
bill with choice elements passed one House of the California Legisla-
ture, and a choice bill was reported out of committee in Nevada.
Hearings were held on choice bills in at least two additional states
(Arizona and Maryland).
In 1988 and 1989, articles about choice in auto insurance ap-
peared in several nationwide publications,'6 and choice was the sub-
ject of numerous meetings and conferences. A new nationwide con-
sumer organization, Project New Start, formed to promote consumer
choice in auto insurance. One industry trade association was so
moved by all the activity that it issued a bulletin entitled No-Fault
Reborn.1
7
The concept of choice in auto insurance is simple. Give individual
motorists the right to choose for themselves whether they want liabil-
ity or compensation insurance. Make government surrender in part
its right to decree the kind of insurance motorists must have. Make
sure there will be no unfair advantages, windfalls, or burdens to any
consumer, regardless of the choice he or she makes.
The auto insurance system today is widely perceived as rigid and
overly expensive; it appears to be highly unpopular; and state legisla-
8. Amendments of H.B. 2059, 1989 Sess. (Ariz. 1989).
9. A.B. 744, 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989); A.B. 2315, 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989);
S.B. 1232, 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989).
10. H.B. 206, 135th Sess. (Del. 1989).
11. S.B. 214, 1989 Sess. (Haw. 1989).
12. H.B. 1434, 1989 Sess. (Md. 1989).
13. S.B. 520, 1989 Sess. (Nev. 1989).
14. H.B. 2218, 1989 Sess. (Wash. 1989).
15. Choice in auto insurance was the subject of hearings and reports by a special
commission and by the Automobile Rating Board of the Province of Ontario, Canada.
The Provincial Government decided to recommend to Parliament that Ontario shift from
an add-on mandatory no-fault system to a no-lawsuit (except for death or serious and
permanent injury) mandatory no-fault system. The government rejected choice because it
did not have a working model bill and because, even if it had such a bill, it believed it
would take longer to implement a choice system than a traditional threshold system.
16. E.g., Paulson, The Compelling Case for No-Fault Insurance, CHANGING
TIMES, July 1989, at 49; Quinn, Car Drivers in Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1989, at 55;
Sloane, Car Insurance: Two Choices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1989, at 52, col. 1; Passell,
Selling No-Fault Insurance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at D2, col. 1.
17. "Despite the fact that virtually no state has permanently enacted a new auto
no-fault law since the mid-1970s, the concept has experienced a rebirth in legislative,
industry, and academic circles. The concept of 'optional no-fault' or 'freedom of choice'
has also surfaced." ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, BULLETIN TO CHIEF EXECUTIVES,
BULLETIN No. 89-35 (July 21, 1989).
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tures and governors have not been able to change it enough to win
public approval. If consumers of auto insurance could choose (and
reject) insurance service products the same way they choose (and
reject) automobiles, stereos, and other consumer products, auto in-
surance might be less expensive and consumers might be more satis-
fied."8 Making consumer choice available as to auto insurance, by
permitting individuals to give up the right to litigate in tort in return
for lower insurance premiums, might also lead to the United States
becoming less of a "litigious society.'
59
The right to choose the type of auto insurance would be of special
benefit to the urban poor because, for them, liability insurance, the
only kind of insurance available in more than one-half the states, is
never a good value. It charges poor drivers a higher percentage of
their annual income than it does middle-class and wealthy drivers,
18. There has also been opposition to the idea of choice. Professor George Priest of
the Yale Law School, for example, opposes choice on the ground that accident-prone
drivers would be induced, under a choice system, to select the no-fault choice rather than
the fault choice because rates under the no-fault system would be lower.
[N]o-fault coverage is likely to be preferred by drivers that are relatively more
claims- or accident-prone. In contrast, fault coverage is likely to be preferred
by drivers that are relatively less likely to have negligence claims filed against
them. Though the vast majority of drivers may be ignorant of their claims
proclivity . ., the systematic preference for specific insurance coverage by
some conscious few will skew the respective no-fault and fault insurance pools.
G. Priest, Allowing Drivers a Choice Between No-Fault and Fault-Based Auto Insur-
ance: An Analytical Critique 6 (Nov. 17, 1988) (unpublished manuscript). Priest also
said:
[D]rivers that are relatively more accident-prone in general, as well as those
relatively more likely to inflict injury on others, will systematically prefer no-
fault to fault-based insurance. Drivers conscious of their greater accident pro-
clivity at the time the choice option is introduced will choose no-fault immedi-
ately. . . .All drivers with greater than average accident proclivity will face
lower expected auto insurance premiums in the no-fault insurance pool.
Id. at 28. Professor Priest offers no evidence in support of his predictions as to market-
place behavior and he does not show (or even allege) that selection by poor drivers of the
lowest cost auto insurance system would increase the number of auto accidents or other-
wise be contrary to public policy.
Other arguments against choice in auto insurance are set forth in this symposium: see
Carr, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An Economic
Critique, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1087 (1989); Little, Reducing Noneconomic Damages
by Trick, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1017 (1989). The negative consequences of choice
predicted by Professors Priest, Carr, and Little have not been observed in the two juris-
dictions that have actually enacted and implemented auto insurance choice systems, Ken-
tucky and New Jersey. The absence of empirical verification of the predictions of the
opponents of choice, in the jurisdictions that have implemented consumer choice mecha-
nisms, makes me doubt, as to the choice mechanisms in these jurisdictions, whether the
theoretical objections of the professors are valid.
19. American litigiousness has an impact on many aspects of national life, includ-
ing, perhaps, on American international competitiveness. There are now more graduates
from law school each year in the United States than the total number of lawyers in
Japan. There are 365 people for each lawyer in the United States, whereas there are
approximately 1,250 to 1,500 people per lawyer in the countries of Western Europe.
Between 1967 and 1983, the number of lawyers in the United States more than doubled.
See generally Silber, The Litigious Society, in STRAIGHT SHOOTING 212-42 (1989).
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and it does not give them anything they need if they are injured in
an accident. Liability insurance pays amounts a policyholder is liable
to pay another, but it does not, unlike health insurance or fire insur-
ance, pay the policyholder anything. Well-to-do people need liability
insurance because it protects them from the risk of losing their prop-
erty if they cause a loss while they are at fault. Poor people do not
need it, because they do not own property that can be attached and
taken. What they need, which liability insurance does not provide, is
money to replace their own lost wages, and money to pay their own
hospital and medical bills.
The government, in thirty-nine of the fifty states, requires every-
one to buy liability insurance as a condition of operating a motor
vehicle.20 Most of the laws are relatively easy to evade,2' and thus, it
is not surprising that many motorists are not complying with these
laws.
Since liability insurance is of little personal value to a motorist
who does not own substantial property, it would be good public pol-
icy to allow motorists to choose an alternate type of motor vehicle
insurance that does have value to them. Allowing motorists to choose
a type of insurance that has value to them would probably increase
the rate of voluntary compliance with the compulsory insurance
laws.2
Although there is growing interest in the concept of choice in auto
insurance, for the foregoing reasons, no consensus has developed yet
20. The following states, plus the District of Columbia, had compulsory liability
insurance laws as of January 1989: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
21. For example, a motorist can present the motor vehicle department with a re-
ceipt showing that he or she paid the first installment on an automobile insurance policy,
as proof of compliance with the insurance requirement. After the car is registered, the
owner can cancel that policy or default on further premium payments under it. The
motor vehicle department may get a notice of cancellation from the insurance company,
but it is unlikely, because of lack of resources, to investigate and commence proceedings
against that owner. The motor vehicle department will probably not be involved with this
motorist until the next time his or her automobile is required to be registered.
22. There are other ways to encourage voluntary compliance with the compulsory
insurance laws. If the owner of a motor vehicle who is required to maintain insurance
fails to do so, that owner should be prohibited from claiming against or suing any other
person in tort, and he or she should be prohibited from collecting either tort/liability
insurance damages or automobile compensation insurance benefits. One reason for the
high cost of auto insurance today may be that there are a large number of motor vehicle
owners who collect judgments but never pay premiums.
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as to the best mechanism to use to assure that consumers can make
an informed and rational choice, and to guarantee them a real
chance to reduce their auto insurance bills. The next section of this
Article is devoted to examining eight different possible choice mech-
anisms. The final section of this Article will summarize the issues
and problems that ought to be addressed in any choice law.
II. CHOOSING AMONG ALTERNATIVE CHOICE SYSTEMS
A. Choosing Tort Insurance or Compensation Insurance: OJ
Choice
Professor O'Connell and I developed a choice mechanism that we
believed would be fair to all consumers, give consumers an opportu-
nity to reduce their rates, and be acceptable to motorists and their
legislators.23 The O'Connell-Joost Plan (OJ choice) provided that
each owner of a motor vehicle would be free to choose whether to
buy fault insurance or no-fault insurance. If he or she chose no-fault
insurance (contract compensation insurance) the owner, any resident
member of his or her family, and any occupant of the owner's car (a
compensation insured) would be compensated for their medical ex-
penses, any wage losses, and any other economic loss resulting from
a motor vehicle accident. Each compensation insured would be com-
pensated for his or her economic loss up to the limits set forth in the
insurance policy. The compensation insured would not, however, be
able to sue the person who caused the accident, nor would he or she
be able to obtain any tort damages from that person or that person's
insurance company. Furthermore, the compensation insured would
not be able to obtain any money under any auto insurance policy for
noneconomic losses such as "pain and suffering."
If, on the other hand, the owner of a motor vehicle chose fault
insurance (tort insurance), tort liability and tort damage rules would
apply. If such owner, any resident member of his or her family, or
any occupant of his or her car (a tort insured) could prove that he or
she was injured in a motor vehicle accident as a result of the fault of
another person, they could recover their medical expenses and any
other economic loss and, in addition, a sum for their pain and suffer-
ing and other noneconomic loss. If a tort insured were sued by an
eligible litigant who alleged that the tort insured's fault caused an
injury, the tort insured would be defended by his or her own insur-
ance company. That insurance company would be obligated to pay
any lawful claims against him or her, up to the dollar limits of the
policy.
Under OJ choice, each victim of a motor vehicle accident would
23. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 77.
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receive the same measure of damages/benefits that he or she would
under either a mandatory tort/liability system or a mandatory no-
fault/compensation system, depending upon which system he or she
chooses. There is, however, one procedural difference. This difference
occurs when the accident involves a person who is a tort insured and
a person who is a compensation insured. Under OJ choice, the acci-
dent victim who is a tort insured cannot claim against and sue a
compensation insured. The victim must file his or her claim against
his or her own insurance company. The victim would recover, under
the connector insurance policy which would be part of each tort in-
surance package, exactly the same elements of damage, under the
same conditions and the same or more money2 ' as he or she would
have obtained under the tort system today. The recovery, however,
would be from the victim's own insurance company.
The mechanism of connector insurance was deemed necessary to
avoid giving the tort insured an undeserved windfall at the expense
of the compensation insured. If a compensation insured could be
sued by a tort insured, the compensation insured who had attachable
assets would have to buy tort insurance, in addition to compensation
insurance, and his total insurance premiums would therefore be
larger. At the same time, the premiums paid by a tort insured would
be smaller, because the tort insured would be immune from a lawsuit
by a compensation insured, because compensation insureds cannot
bring lawsuits. Connector insurance eliminates this unfairness by
providing that a tort insured will recover tort damages from his or
her own company, if the at-fault party is a no-fault compensation
insured. Connector insurance assures that the tort insured's premi-
ums will not be unfairly reduced and that the compensation insured's
premiums will not be unfairly increased.
Bills based on the OJ choice model were introduced in a number
of states in 1989. None were enacted. Although other reasons can be
given to explain this failure,25 the requirement that a tort insured
24. A 1984 study of compensation paid to uninsured motorists found that accident
victims were recovering about 10% more money under uninsured motorist insurance,
from their own insurers, than they were recovering under liability insurance from the at-
fault driver's insurer. ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, UNINSURED MO-
TORIST FACTS & FIGURES INSURANCE (1984). Since connector insurance is very similar
to uninsured motorist insurance, the victim who recovers tort damages under it may also
recover more money than he or she would have recovered from another motorist's insur-
ance policy.
25. Choice in auto insurance is a new concept; state legislative sessions are too
short to make enactment of any new proposal likely the first time it is considered; and
vigorous opposition by a strong special interest prompts legislators to be cautious.
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always recover damages from his or her own insurer may be partly
to blame. If a victim is injured by a compensation insured who was
at fault, it seems unfair to make that victim file a claim with his or
her own insurance company and risk being surcharged on the basis
of accident involvement. Why require accident victims to seek tort
damages from their own insurance companies when their injuries are
caused by the fault of someone else?
A consumer group study conducted in August 1989 on the "Free-
dom of Choice" concept26 showed distrust of insurance companies:
One aspect of the Freedom of Choice idea that "did not compute" with
people was the idea that if one chooses tort, but is hit by an at-fault driver,
one can still collect for pain and suffering from one's own company. "You
mean we sue our own company. Then we'd be dropped."2 7
It would be a mistake to draw too many inferences from this limited
study, but it would also be a mistake to ignore it, in light of other
evidence of widespread distrust of insurance companies. For exam-
ple, in the November 1988 California election, an auto insurance ini-
tiative labeled as the "all industry initiative" received less than one
vote out of every three cast.
The OJ choice model could be changed to respond to this public
concern. Each owner of a motor vehicle could be given a choice
which does not involve choosing between receiving compensation
benefits from his own insurance company or tort damages from his
or her own insurance company (if the at-fault driver is covered by
no-fault insurance). It is not necessary to require a person to choose
between alternatives, each of which might require accident victims
to file some or all claims with their own insurers.2" To avoid giving
tort insureds a windfall, an auto insurance risk exchange would be
established to moderate or eliminate both overpayment and
windfall.29
Alternatively, the OJ choice model could be changed by establish-
ing a government fund to pay all of the valid claims that tort in-
sureds have against people who cannot be sued, instead of requiring
26. Participants in the focus groups were selected at random from a pool of people
each of whom was the major financial decisionmaker for his or her family and held a
valid driver's license. Prior to the interviews, the participants were not told the topic of
the discussion. The leading insurer who sponsored them was never identified. State Farm
Insurance Companies, Research Department, Consumer Focus Groups on the Freedom
of Choice Concept (Aug. 1989) [hereinafter Consumer Focus].
27. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
28. An auto insurance choice bill should include provisions that prohibit the prac-
tices that have given rise to distrust of insurance companies. It should include: (1) a
provision that makes it clear that a consumer cannot be punished (surcharged, canceled,
or denied renewal) merely for making a claim against his own insurance company; and
(2) a provision that requires an insurance company to pay treble damages and attorneys'
fees and to reinstate a policy if the company is found to have violated clause (1).
29. For a discussion of the risk exchange concept, see infra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
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tort insureds to sue their own insurance companies to recover such
amounts. One consultant has suggested that "the premium that the
selector of the tort system pays for [tort liability] coverage [could
be] paid into a state fund by the carriers [less acquisition costs]."30
Claimants in tort who are entitled to receive money against compen-
sation tortfeasors could then be paid the amount of those claims
from that state fund. "Those people who choose the tort system
would not have to sue their own carrier; they would make claims
against the State managed fund established for just that purpose."' 31
B. Choosing To Reject Compensation Benefits and Choosing to
Sue to Recover Tort Damages: The Lawsuit Choice
The system described in the caption to this section has been in
effect in Kentucky since 1975.32 Every motorist in that state is re-
quired to buy compensation insurance, unless he affirmatively rejects
the compensation system. Every motorist has the right to reject the
compensation system and choose instead the right to sue in tort, pro-
vided he or she maintains tort liability insurance for the protection of
others. The key to the Kentucky choice law is the following
provision:
Any person may refuse to consent to the limitations of his tort rights and
liabilities as contained in this section. Such rejection must be in writing in a
form to be prescribed by the department of insurance and must have been
executed and filed with the department at a time prior to any motor vehicle
accident for which such rejection is to apply .... 33
The mechanism of the Kentucky choice law is the same as that of
the Arizona Worker's Compensation Law.34 The Arizona industrial
accident law, which was enacted in 1925 and has been in effect for
far more than half a century, sets up a choice system. It provides for
the payment of compensation benefits to all injured workers in Ari-
zona, providing that "it shall be optional with employees to accept
compensation as provided by this chapter or to reject the provisions
of this chapter and retain the right to sue the employer as provided
by law."3 5 An Arizona worker, in other words, has the right, prior to
injuries, to choose whether to sue his employer in an action for negli-
30. Letter from Eric S. Tachau to Robert H. Joost (Nov. 2, 1989) [hereinafter
Tachau Letter].
31. Id.
32. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 (Baldwin 1987).
33. Id. at 304.39-060(4).
34. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901-1091 (1983).
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-906(A) (1983).
1041
gence or to accept compensation benefits. If the worker elects to sue,
he "takes his chances," in the words of the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona, "of whether he will recover" at all, but if he does recover, his
damage award will include "the element of pain and suffering [as
determined by] the sound discretion of the jury. '3 6 If he accepts
compensation benefits, he will obtain benefits, but the amount of the
benefits will be limited. If he elects to sue, he has the "burden of
proving negligence on the part of the employer," but his damage
award will not be limited, if he wins, to schedule amounts or formu-
las, and there will be no limitation, based on the amount that an
Industrial Commission might award, on the amount of his
recovery.
37
This choice approach has worked well for a great many years, in
both Kentucky and Arizona. It has never been repealed, significantly
amended, or the subject of major amendment efforts. Neither state
has declared it unconstitutional, in whole or part. Virtually everyone,
in both states, chooses to remain in the compensation system, which
means there is no need to create a special mechanism to assure the
equitable reallocation of premium dollars.
C. Choosing to Reject the Right to Sue and Choosing to Obtain
Compensation Benefits: The No-Lawsuit Choice
The No-Lawsuit Choice system is the opposite of the Lawsuit
Choice system. Under this system, every motorist would be entitled
to reject the right to sue another person in tort, provided he or she
chose to maintain a policy of compensation insurance.
New Jersey has come close to putting this system into effect. All
New Jersey motorists are required to maintain a policy of tort liabil-
ity insurance and a policy of compensation insurance that provides
for payment of unlimited medical expenses in case of accident. As of
January 1, 1989, they have been allowed to choose (1) to sue any
alleged wrongdoer for injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident,
or (2) to sue any alleged wrongdoer for injury resulting from a mo-
tor vehicle accident only if the injury:
[R]esults in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture;
loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or
system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or mem-
ber; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; or a medi-
cally determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which
prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the mate-
rial acts which constitute that person's usual and customary daily activities
for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the
occurrence of the injury or impairment.3 8
36. Myers v. Rollette, 103 Ariz. 225, 233, 439 P.2d 497, 502-503 (1968).
37. Id.
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:6A-8.a (West Supp. 1989). This language was taken ver-
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If New Jersey motorists choose the second alternative (limited
right to sue), they will not be able to obtain tort damages unless
their injury fits within the description quoted above. They also will
not have to pay as much for their auto insurance. Data for one town
in New Jersey, for the first year of operation of this law, indicates
that motorists who choose to give up suing in nonserious injury cases
pay 23.8 % less in premiums for the personal injury portion of their
motor vehicle insurance.39
New Jersey had a form of tort choice law before this one. In 1983,
the state amended its mandatory compensation law to give policy-
holders a choice between medical expense thresholds of $200 or
$1,500 (plus inflation adjustment). An accident victim could bring a
tort claim only if his or her medical expenses exceeded the threshold
amount that he or she had chosen." The 1988 law substituted more
meaningful choices, but it did not allow New Jersey motorists to
choose between tort recovery or compensation recovery.
On February 7, 1990 the Governor of Pennsylvania signed a no-
lawsuit choice proposal into law. The new Pennsylvania law will give
all motorists, effective July 1, 1990, a choice between a limited tort
option and a full tort option.41 A limited tort insured who is injured
in an accident can "seek recovery for all medical and other out-of
pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering unless the injuries
fall within the definition of 'serious injury' [or another defined
exception] .42
Every motor vehicle liability insurance policy in Pennsylvania
shall include compensation coverage for "required benefits" for up to
$5,000 for medical expenses for each accident victim. 3 Each insurer
must, in addition, make available for purchase up to $100,000 for
medical benefits and up to more than one million dollars for ex-
batim from the New York auto insurance law. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5102(d) (McKinney
1985).
39. The insurance premium for the average married couple in Red Bank, New
Jersey was $502 for liability and $36 for uninsured motorist insurance if they chose the
right to sue. The premium was $378 for liability and $32 for uninsured motorist'if they
chose to give up the right to sue in most cases. See Sloane, Car Insurance: Two Choices,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1989, at 52, col. 1. Unfortunately, most of the New Jersey premium
savings resulting from choice were offset by additional surcharges which were imposed on
all policyholders for the benefit of the Joint Underwriting Association. Telephone inter-
view with representative of Traveler's Insurance Co. (Oct. 24, 1989).
40. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6a-1 to -35 (West Supp. 1985).
41. Act of Feb. 7, 1990, § 8 (adding 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1705(a)(1),
1791.1(b)).
42. Id. (amending 75 PA. CONS. STAT. 88 1705(a)(1)A, 1791.1(b)A).
43. Id. (amending 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1711(a)).
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traordinary medical benefits. (New Jersey law, by contrast, requires
each motorist to maintain coverage for unlimited required benefits
for reasonable medical and rehabilitation expenses.) 44
The far lower required compensation limits under the Pennsylva-
nia law probably mean that there will be a significant number of
lawsuits in Pennsylvania for uncompensated economic loss. The liti-
gants in these lawsuits, who have elected the limited tort option, will
not be eligible for pain and suffering (noneconomic loss) damages,
but there is no mechanism to prevent a sympathetic jury from in-
cluding an uncharacterized additional amount in a verdict for excess
economic losses. The $5,000 Pennsylvania compensation benefit is, in
fact, so low, when one considers the cost of hospital rooms and high
technology medical tests, treatments, and therapies, that the number
of lawsuits in Pennsylvania may not decline significantly under the
new choice law. There is certainly no evidence to sustain the legisla-
ture in requiring insurers to reduce the premiums of all insureds who
elect the limited tort option twelve percent more than the required
premium reductions for full tort insureds.45
Existing New Jersey and Pennsylvania laws require all motorists
to maintain both no-fault compensation insurance and tort liability
insurance. The same right to choose to reject the right to sue others
could be given to motorists in a state that only requires tort liability
insurance, provided they voluntarily commit themselves to maintain
compensation insurance.
Every motorist in a mandatory liability insurance state is already
subject to an obligation to buy a tort/liability insurance policy. Each
motorist in such a state would, under the system proposed in this
section, be entitled to waive the right to sue others in tort if he
bought the amount of insurance required by that state in the form of
compensation insurance. Consideration has not yet been given by
any legislature to granting such authority to the motorists in any
tort/liability state, but it could easily be done.
The following provision, or its equivalent, should be at the heart of
a law allowing motorists to choose by rejecting the right-to-sue law
in a tort state:
Each person who maintains a compensation insurance policy subject to the
!imits required under this law, and who maintains a policy of compensation
insurance in accordance with those limits, may select the lawsuit reduction
option. Each person who selects, or who is bound by the selection of, a
lawsuit reduction option is barred from filing a claim or maintaining a law-
suit in tort, up to the limits set forth in that option, against any other per-
son for bodily injury, death, or property damage arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle except for injuries resulting
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 1973 & Supp. 1989).
45. § 1799.7(b).
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from, for example, intentional action, driving under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, or product liability.
To ensure that the person who chooses to surrender the right to
sue realizes the savings he deserves, the legislation should have a
provision like that in the New Jersey statute, which creates and sets
forth the powers of an "Automobile Insurance Risk Exchange.""6
The risk exchange would require all insurers in the state to reallo-
cate premium income to reflect actual system costs. Consider the rel-
ative positions of two insurers in the absence of such a reallocation
mechanism. The first insures X, who gives up the right to sue others
in tort. Xs insurer will neither save any money because of that
waiver, nor be able to lower the policyholder's premiums because it
will still have to defend and pay any liability judgments against X.
However, savings are enjoyed by the insurer of Y, another policy-
holder, whose negligence causes serious injury to X, because Y is
immune from suit by X. A risk exchange would require Y's insurer
to reimburse X's insurer, which could in turn lower Xs premiums.
The difficulty of creating a risk exchange and workable exchange
rules should not be permitted to obfuscate the importance of creating
a mechanism that will reward motorists who give up, in whole or in
part, the right to sue: the reward being lower premiums.
D. Choice Limited to the Amount of Insurance Required by the
State to Operate a Motor Vehicle: First Party Zone Choice
Each state in the United States requires each owner of a motor
vehicle to maintain financial responsibility in an amount set by the
state, or it requires each such owner to maintain a policy of insur-
ance or self-insurance in an amount set by the state.
It would be a reasonable extension of the governmental policy un-
derlying these laws to allow each owner of a motor vehicle to choose
whether he or she wishes to be covered, up to the amount set by such
46.
There shall be created . .. the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Risk Ek-
change. . . .Every insurer licensed to transact private passenger automobile
insurance in this State shall be a member of the exchange and shall be bound
by the rule of the exchange as a condition of the authority to transact insur-
ance business in this State. . . .The exchange shall be empowered to raise
sufficient moneys (1) to pay its operating expenses, and (2) to compensate
members of the exchange for claims paid for noneconomic loss, and associated
claim adjustment expenses, which would not have been incurred had the tort
limitation option ...been elected by the injured party filing the claim for
noneconomic loss ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-21 to -22 (West Supp. 1989).
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law, by compensation insurance or tort insurance. It would be a fur-
ther reasonable extension to allow each motorist to pick, on the basis
of personal experience, the comments of friends, or advertising, the
insurance company that would be obligated under either policy.
The financial responsibility or compulsory coverage law of any
state that wishes to offer choice on a first party zone basis should be
amended to provide that a motorist can satisfy the provisions of the
law by either:
(a) purchasing first party tort/liability insurance covering the
owner of a vehicle, resident family members, occupants of the
owner's car, and certain strangers, in the amounts specified in the
existing state law; or
(b) purchasing first party personal injury and collision no-fault/
compensation insurance for the owner of the vehicle, resident mem-
bers of his family, occupants of his car, and any strangers injured by
a named insured, in the amounts specified in the existing state law.
Above the zone (that is, above the amounts specified in existing
state law), no insurance would be required. Individuals who own
homes or other attachable assets would, of course, be free to buy
above-the-zone tort/liability insurance.
E. Choice Limited to One Segment of the Market
Another variation of the choice theme calls for limiting the right
to choose to one defined segment of the auto insurance market. It
has been suggested that the choice system be adopted only with re-
spect to low income drivers, only with respect to specified urban ar-
eas with many uninsured drivers, or only with respect to senior
citizens.
To date, only one jurisdiction, California, has acted on legislation
providing choice for only one segment of the population. The Cali-
fornia Assembly, in June 1989, passed a bill that provided for choice
throughout the state, but only for low income drivers. 47 This bill
granted low income applicants48 who are good drivers49 and who are
47. A.B. 2315, 1989-90 Sess. (Cal. 1989). The choice element of the bill was later
eliminated by the California Senate. The remainder of the bill was passed by the Senate
on September 15, 1989. It was vetoed by the Governor on October 2, 1989.
48. The term was defined to mean a person who is "qualified for universal tele-
phone service under . .. [Art. 8 commencing with section 871 of chapter 4 of part 1 of
division I of] the California Public Utilities Code." Id. (proposed amendment to CAL.
INS. CODE § 11605(d)). The relevance of this definition to motor vehicle insurance is
difficult to determine.
49. A good driver was defined as one who had been licensed to drive the previous
three years and who had never, during the preceding three years, been convicted of
drunk driving, had more than one violation point, or been the driver of a motor vehicle
that was involved, as a result of the driver's fault, in an accident involving bodily injury
or more than $1,000 of property damage. Id. (proposed amendment to CAL. INS. CODE §
11605(c)).
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unable to obtain insurance through the voluntary market the right to
choose the kind of insurance they want.
California law required all motorists to satisfy the state's financial
responsibility requirements: a tort insurance policy that pays for
damages to others up to $15,000/$30,000 for bodily injury or death
and up to $5,000 for damage to property other than a motor vehicle.
Assembly Bill 2315 provided that an eligible driver could also satisfy
the financial responsibility requirements by purchasing a compensa-
tion insurance policy5" that provides benefits up to $15,000 for the
policyholder and any other covered person for medical and rehabili-
tation treatment, loss of earnings from work, and certain other
expenses."1
There were serious, but correctable, problems with Assembly Bill
2315. After the proposed program's first year, the premiums for one
alternative would have been subsidized while the premiums for the
other alternative would have been unsubsidized. Over time, the sub-
sidized alternative would be significantly and artificially cheaper
than the unsubsidized alternative. It would, therefore, probably be
the choice that more and more low income drivers would make. The
total cost of the subsidy, which would undoubtedly be paid by all
Californians in the form of higher insurance costs or higher state
debt, would probably grow from year to year.
The source of the lack of fairness was the proposed section
11609(c) of the California Insurance Code. Subdivision (a) would
have provided that the initial maximum annual premium for a per-
son eligible to choose a liability policy would be $220. Subdivision
(b) would have provided that the initial maximum annual premium
for a person eligible to choose a personal injury protection policy
would be $180. Proposed subdivision (c) of that section then created
the inequity, as follows: "(c) The rates prescribed by this section
shall remain in effect until July 1, 1991, and thereafter shall be ad-
justed so as to be actuarially sound, except that for that rate estab-
lished by subdivision (a), no adjustment shall exceed that permitted
50. It is termed a "personal injury protection" policy. Id. (proposed amendment to
CAL. INS. CODE § 11605(0).
51. Proposed section 11618.1 of the Insurance Code provided an additional $3,000
death benefit for the death of a person covered by a compensation policy, if the death
arose out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle. Id. (proposed amendment to CAL.
INS. CODE § 11618.1(a)(3)).
The Assembly-passed bill would have added a new section 16020.2 to the California
Vehicle Code. According to this section, compensation insurance coverage "shall for all
purposes satisfy the financial responsibility requirements. Id. (proposed amend-
ment to CAL. INS. CODE § 16020.2).
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by Section 11610. ' ' 52 Section 11610 did not require that future rates
for the liability policy be "actuarially sound." It only authorized fu-
ture rates for the liability policy to be adjusted to the amount neces-
sary to avoid enormous losses pursuant to a complicated formula, 53
and "to reflect any inflation. 54
The unfairness that would result from subsidizing one alternative
but not the other is inconsistent with the idea of choice. Unless a
choice system applies the same standards to each alternative, it
should never be supported. Proposed sections 11609 and 11610 of
the California bill could have been amended to make both choice
alternatives "actuarially sound" or subsidized. All that was needed
to make both policies unsubsidized was to delete the portions of sec-
tion 11609(c) italicized above and minor changes in section
11610(b). 55
Unfortunately, the California Senate chose to delete the entire
choice mechanism from the bill, leaving only a compulsory subsi-
dized liability insurance bill. The baby was thrown out, one might
say, with the bathwater.
The choice provisions of Assembly Bill 2315 were removed by the
California Senate, but the idea of limiting choice to a single segment
of the market, such as a specified urban area or the poor, may occur
again. The idea, as indicated, is interesting, provided the choice it
offers is fair. Any such choice system will probably be confronted
with one argument that will not be raised as to other choice models:
the argument that it is unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection.
F. Choosing a Noneconomic Loss Benefit under Compensation
Insurance: Pain and Suffering Choice
One of the features of no-fault compensation insurance which
most troubles nonpartisan observers is that it denies an accident vic-
52. Id. (proposed amendment to CAL. INS. CODE § 11609(c)).
53. Rates can be increased if "the [initial] premium has resulted in an aggregate
loss to insurers that exceeds the aggregate loss to insurers under the assigned-risk plan in
1989, by more than 40 percent of the savings realized by insurers in uninsured motorist
loss costs for that years. . . ." Id. (proposed amendment to CAL. INS. CODE § 11610(b)).
The California assigned risk plan deficit for 1989 is projected to be approximately $262
million, which means that the premium charged for a choice liability policy cannot be
increased unless the loss to insurers exceeds that amount plus an additional percentage.
54. Id. (proposed amendment to CAL. INS. CODE § 11610(c)).
55. Specifically, "subdivision (a) of" would have to be deleted from section
11610(b) at two places. Alternatively, "for the rate established by subdivision (a)," could
have been deleted from section 11609(c), and "subdivision (a) of" could have been de-
leted on two occasions from section 11610(b). Both choice alternatives would still be
subsidized during the first year of the program, but that result may be unavoidable be-
cause there is no actuarial experience in California for a no-fault or compensation insur-
ance policy.
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tim any compensation for intangible or noneconomic losses. Pain and
suffering, the term usually used for such losses, is undeniably real for
an accident victim. It is also extremely difficult to quantify in dollar
terms.
Any choice model could deal with this problem if it offered an
insured a "pain and suffering" choice supplement. If the motorist
who is injured in an accident caused by the fault of another chooses
the tort option, he or she would, as a basic right, be eligible to re-
cover a sum for pain and suffering, in addition to damages for eco-
nomic loss. If the motorist chooses the compensation option, on the
other hand, he or she could be given additional coverage for pain and
suffering, in addition to the basic coverage for economic loss.
The worker's compensation statutes of each of the fifty states and
the District of Columbia provide for additional benefits to victims
who suffer from specified types of injury. State legislators, state in-
surance commissioners, and insurance companies could copy and ap-
ply these provisions with respect to auto accident victims who choose
compensation insurance. If society is able to provide additional bene-
fits for all industrial accident victims with specified types of injury, it
could do the same for auto accident victims.
Alternatively, the compensation insured who is injured in a motor
vehicle accident could be paid a lump-sum amount for his or her
pain and suffering, calculated by multiplying the amount of his or
her medical expenses by an arbitrary number. The advantage of the
multiplication method is that it is easy to use and avoids any need
for a commission, board, or court in case of disagreement. The dis-
advantage is that it could be unfair because some inexpensive-to-
treat injuries are very painful. In addition, it would give persons who
are treated by more expensive doctors and hospitals a higher amount
for pain and suffering, and it might encourage victims to pursue un-
necessary treatments.
The right to choose between (1) economic loss benefits plus
noneconomic benefits, and (2) only economic loss benefits will be a
meaningful choice for consumers only if it is offered in conjunction
with one of the other choice models set forth in this article. Allowing
motorists a choice only as to pain and suffering benefits, while per-
mitting accident victims the unrestricted right to sue others in tort
for any economic losses sustained in excess of required compensation
benefits will not be a meaningful choice if the amount of required
benefits is low. If the required benefits are low, most victims will be
able to sue alleged tortfeasors. If most victims can file tort lawsuits,
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most jury verdicts will probably include an unidentified amount for
pain and suffering if the victim's plight was compelling and if plain-
tiff's counsel was persuasive. Since settlement amounts generally re-
flect jury awards, the total payout in no pain-and-suffering cases
may be only slightly lower than the payout in full damages cases.
G. Choosing Tort or Compensation After an Accident
All of the choice mechanisms described in this article, so far, re-
quire the policyholder to decide before a motor vehicle accident
which choice shall be operative, in the event of an accident. The poli-
cyholder must decide in advance, for example, whether he or she
wishes to be compensated under tort liability rules or under compen-
sation rules, in case of an accident, or whether he or she wishes to be
able to bring a tort lawsuit in all cases or only in a few.
A different choice mechanism is proposed in another article in this
symposium. It would not require a policyholder or other accident vic-
tim to choose until after an accident had occurred.5 6 If a practical
postaccident choice auto insurance policy could be developed, it
would be free of the element of uncertainty which is inherent in any
pre-accident choice system. No one knows, for example, until after
an accident, which alternative would be the best for a victim of that
accident.
The liability option would pay relatively more money than the no-fault
option if the accident victim involved is one who has suffered only moderate
injuries, such as back sprain, whiplash, or fracture. Moderate injuries cause
only limited medical expense and work loss, but they can cause a great deal
of pain and suffering, compensable under liability insurance but not under
no-fault insurance. . . .[On the other hand, the] no-fault option would as-
sure relatively more money than the liability option to an accident victim
who suffers very severe injuries such as a severing of the spinal cord or a
serious brain concussion.
57
The concept of postaccident choice deserves study.
H. Three Way Choice
Most suppliers of goods and services in the United States offer
more than two basic choices to their customers. The home heating
industry, for example, offers at least three choices: gas heat, electric
heat, or oil heat.
56. Brown, A Choice of Choices: Adding Postaccident Choice to the Menu of No-
Fault Models, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1095 (1989). Postaccident choice could itself be
made optional, as an additional choice alternative to pre-accident choice: "What about
an option that allows the choice whether to make a claim under [c]ompensation or tort to
be made after the injury occurs? Obviously, the premium is higher but why
not? . . . The additional premium for this third choice should not be too great." Tachau
Letter, supra note 30, at 3.
57. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 82-83.
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The auto insurance industry should consider supporting a three
way choice system also, if it can find three compatible alternatives58
and a system that is both workable and in the public interest. In my
opinion, a choice system (whether it offers two or three choices) is in
the public interest if a consumer's choice of one authorized alterna-
tive will not give the insured an unfair advantage over, or measura-
bly diminish, the benefits or increase the costs of, consumers who
elect any of the other alternatives.59
A three-choice system that would be workable, involve compatible
choices, and be in the public interest would be one that allowed each
motorist to buy one of the following three options:
(1) "Current Law Option" would offer accident victims the same
benefits as the law that was in effect in the state prior to the enact-
ment of the choice law;
(2) "High Limits-Compensation Option" would provide the maxi-
mum possible personal injury insurance protection for each insured
motorist and his or her family or guests.
(3) "Low Limits Compensation Option" provides "bare bones"
personal injury insurance protection for each insured motorist, his or
her family or guests, and costs less than any other option.
A person covered by the "Current Law Option" would receive
substantially the same damages for similar injuries as he or she
would receive under current tort law. The source for recovery might
be different, but the standards for liability, measure of damages, and
58. Some incompatibility between alternatives is probably inherent in any auto in-
surance system that allows consumers to choose between liability and compensation op-
tions. A liability system is normally a third party system, and a first party system is
normally incompatible with a third party system. Professor O'Connell and I, in 1986,
converted the liability component in our choice proposal into inverse liability, except as to
other persons with liability insurance. The conversion made the liability option in the
system functionally compatible with the compensation or no-fault option inasmuch as
inverse liability and compensation are both systems of first party insurance.
59. Allowing consumer choice as to a universally mandated service such as auto
insurance is different from allowing choice as to an optional service such as gas, electric,
or oil heat. The buyers of motor vehicle insurance are going to have an effect on each
other whenever there is an accident, whereas the buyers of alternative heating systems
will not. A choice system should not be authorized as to a mandated service when con-
sumers of different choice alternatives will interact, unless the system is in the public
interest. All of the alternative choice mechanisms set forth in this article, except the low
income driver proposal in California, are, in my opinion, in the public interest. The Cali-
fornia proposal is not because the low income driver who chooses its compensation option
would have to pay extra to subsidize the low income driver who chooses its liability op-
tion. The liability chooser would thus be imposing a measurable burden on the compensa-
tion chooser. The likelihood of external costs and burdens seems to increase with the
number of options available.
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bottom line recovery would be the same. Victims covered by this op-
tion would be assured that they would receive payment for economic
and noneconomic losses up to the amount required by the applicable
state's financial responsibility or compulsory coverage auto insurance
statute, if the injury was caused by the fault of another person. If
the insured party's damages exceeded those limits, he or she could
sue the wrongdoer personally, except that the settlement or verdict
amount awarded or granted after such a lawsuit or settlement would
be automatically reduced by the amount of the state's financial re-
sponsibility limits."0
Motorists who preferred not to be covered by the rules of current
law would be able to choose between the "Low Limits Compensation
Option" or the "High Limits Compensation Option." The former
policy would charge the lowest possible premiums for bodily injury
protection and would provide economic loss compensation benefits up
to the per-victim/per-accident amount now required by the state's
financial responsibility limits, including medical but not vocational
rehabilitation. The latter policy would provide the most comprehen-
sive protection and rehabilitation: economic loss compensation bene-
fits up to $250,000 per victim, including vocational as well as medi-
cal rehabilitation benefits.
The option that would be in effect, under a three-way system, for
individuals who failed to indicate a choice, should be the option se-
lected by the owner of the motor vehicle that struck the injured per-
son, or that was occupied by the injured person at the time of the
accident, if such owner had selected an option. If the owner had mo-
tor vehicle insurance but had not indicated his or her choice, his or
her policy choice should be deemed to be the option which the state's
commissioner of insurance determines to be the cheapest.6
The three options would relate to each other as follows:
a) High Limits Compensation: The person covered by this option
would recover up to $250,000, or more if optional extras were se-
lected, but he or she could not sue any other driver in any case,
unless the other driver was drunk or intentionally caused the injury.
A person injured as a result of an auto accident involving this in-
60, Each state's financial responsibility limits would function as the deductible for
its consumer choice auto insurance system.
61. To reduce the need to use these rules, insurance agents should be encouraged
to obtain the names of each likely occupant of a motor vehicle owned or controlled by
each client who elects the same choice option. Agents should be encouraged to issue
"master" policies and renewal notices for households in which the occupants select differ-
ent options. The name of each person insured under a particular option should be written
on the policy and on each renewal notice. Agents should record the choices, but they
should never seek to influence them. If individuals have questions or want advice on what
is the best option for them, agents should send them a brochure prepared by the commis-
sioner of insurance, or direct them to call the state insurance department, so that there
will be statewide uniformity as to standards for choice.
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sured could sue him or her in tort, but the amount of the recovery
would be automatically reduced by the amount of the deductible. An
injured person could sue at any time without a deductible being ap-
plied if he or she could show that this insured was driving drunk or
had intentionally caused the injury.
b) Low Limits Compensation Option: The person covered by this
option would recover up to $25,000 in economic loss benefits. He or
she could maintain a lawsuit in tort against any driver who caused
the injury, subject to the deductible. This insured could be sued in
tort under the same circumstances as the insured who was covered
by the "High Limits Compensation Option."
c) Current Law Option: The person covered by this option would
recover up to the amount of the state's financial responsibility limits,
or applicable policy limits if higher, if the person who caused the
injury was insured under the "Current Law Option" and if the in-
jury was proximately caused by the fault of that person. Alterna-
tively, if the person who caused the accident and injury is not in-
sured under the same option as the victim, the victim would recover
from his or her own insurer, if he or she can show that the injury
was proximately caused by the fault of a specified other person. An
insured under the "Current Law Option" would, as a practical mat-
ter, be immune from suit in tort by an "Low Limits Compensation"
insured up to the amount of the deductible. He or she would also be
immune from suit in tort by a "High Limits Compensation" insured
at any time, unless he or she was driving drunk or intentionally
caused the injury.
Allowing a three-way, rather than a two-way, choice would in-
crease the authority of the individual motorist and decrease the au-
thority of the government. It would offer the consumer more freedom
than a two-way choice.
A two-way choice system allows the motorist to reject the compen-
sation and insurance system which is currently in effect in his state,
but it forces that person to buy whatever else the state government
has authorized. A three-way choice system, by contrast, allows the
consumer who rejects the current system to determine for herself
what coverage she will buy, and she will have a choice between two
alternatives. In the proposal set forth in this section, the consumer
who rejects current law can decide for herself whether she wants to
pay the lowest possible price for auto insurance, or whether she
wants the greatest possible protection in case of accident, regardless
of cost.
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III. KEY INGREDIENTS IN ANY CHOICE SYSTEM
There are a number of issues or problems which should be ad-
dressed in any choice bill, regardless of which mechanism is used to
provide choice to the consumer. Complete answers have not yet been
found for all of these questions, but I think it will be helpful to set
forth the following problems and suggested answers, even if the an-
swers are incomplete, in hopes that others may find better solutions.
A. Establishing a Workable Relationship Between the
Components
There must be a harmonious relationship between each option in
an auto insurance choice system. Assuring that no system is unfairly
prejudiced by the available choices and assuring that no system en-
joys a windfall, may require that each tort insurance policy include a
connector or inverse liability insurance policy so that the tort insured
will not enjoy an unfair benefit at the expense of the compensation
insured. Alternatively, fairness may require that a state establish a
premium reallocation exchange to prevent unfair burdens and unjus-
tified windfalls. No adjustment mechanism may be necessary to pre-
vent unfairness with respect to some choice mechanisms (see Law-
suit Choice and No Lawsuit Choice), but there will always be a need
to monitor the system to assure continued maintenance of a worka-
ble relationship.
The logical person to monitor a choice system is the official desig-
nated to oversee insurance matters: the commissioner of insurance.
The commissioner should be directed to observe and evaluate the
system continuously and to make recommendations for improvement
at least once every two years.
Each major feature of each option in a choice system must work
as intended, if the option itself is to be cost-effective. Responsibility
should be assigned to certify and examine key decisions. For exam-
ple, a choice option that allows a policyholder to sue in tort, if a
specified threshold has been met, should authorize the commissioner
of insurance (or a judge in motions session) to certify that the tort
lawsuit threshold has been met and that the prerequisite to a tort
lawsuit has been met. For another example, a choice option that pro-
hibits a policyholder/victim from recovering pain and suffering dam-
ages should authorize an executive or judicial officer to examine dis-
puted awards, and to annul settlements or order new trials if the
damages awarded exceeds a victim's total economic loss.
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B. Mandatory Compensation Benefit Level and Mandatory Tort
Damage Level
The level of maximum benefits for a victim covered by a basic
compensation insurance policy can be high ($100,000 or more), mod-
erate ($20,000 to $100,000), or low ($15,000 or less). The level of
maximum tort damages which a liability insurer must pay to a vic-
tim injured as a result of the fault of its policyholder may also be
high, moderate, or low. A state which authorizes choice in auto in-
surance must decide how much is enough with respect to each type
of insurance.
One measure of adequacy is need. A recent study found that the
expected lifetime cost of caring for and rehabilitating the average
catastrophically injured auto accident victim is $722,300.62 In 1986,
Professor O'Connell and I recommended a "high ceiling on no-fault
benefits (for example at least $500,000)"' 13 to meet the needs of the
catastrophically injured.
Another measure of adequacy is cost. All of the choice laws intro-
duced in state legislatures in 1989 provided for low mandatory com-
pensation levels. Most required insurers to offer to sell additional
compensation coverage, but consumers who chose that no-fault alter-
native were not required to buy any additional coverage. All of the
financial responsibility and compulsory coverage laws in effect in the
states set low to moderate required insurance levels with respect to
the payment of tort damages to persons injured as a result of the
fault of an insured.64 All of the motor vehicle no-fault laws which
have been enacted, with the exception of the laws in New Jersey and
Michigan, require far less coverage than the AIRAC study indicates
will be needed by catastrophically injured victims.
It is arguable that the required amount of auto insurance should
be high enough so that each beneficiary will be assured enough
62. ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, CATASTROPHIC NO-FAULT
AUTO INJURY CLAIMS (1989).
63. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 80. It was noted that the amount was high
but that it was not, like the amount of medical benefits available under worker's compen-
sation insurance, unlimited. We did not recommend unlimited benefits, despite the simi-
larity between auto and industrial accidents, because unlimited auto compensation insur-
ance might be significantly more expensive than unlimited worker's compensation. "Auto
accident victims... tend to be much more seriously injured and are younger than seri-
ously injured industrial accident victims." Id.
64. Of the 50 states, 21 require a motorist to be able to provide $25,000 for any
victim and $50,000 for all of the victims of a motor vehicle accident. The lowest limits
set by any state are $10,000/$20,000 (Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
New York, and Oklahoma) and the highest are $50,000/$100,000 (Alaska).
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money to pay for lifetime treatment and rehabilitation if he or she is
catastrophically injured. It is not surprising, however, to see that the
required amount has usually been set far lower than the catastrophic
cost. The number of catastrophic injury cases each year is very small
by comparison with the total number of auto accident cases. In
1982, for example, only 17,000 motor vehicle accident injuries were
rated as "severe" (AIS-4) 65 and only 6,000 such injuries were rated
as "critical" (AIS-5) out of a total of approximately 3,327,000 auto
accident injuries. These figures indicate that only 0.0007 % of all
motor vehicle accidents in the United States were catastrophic in
nature in 1982.6
It is arguable that the operators of automobiles should pay -all of
the costs they impose on society. According to this argument, the
required amount of auto insurance should be high enough to assure
adequate treatment and rehabilitation for the seven out of 100,000
victims whose injuries are catastrophic.
Unfortunately, requiring each insured to maintain even $100,000/
$300,000 of tort liability or compensation insurance would substan-
tially raise, not lower, average motor vehicle insurance premiums.
Since premium reduction is the engine that is pulling the insurance
reform train, legislation that would raise rather than lower insurance
premiums is not likely to be enacted in any state.
The financial responsibility/compulsory coverage auto insurance
laws in each of the fifty states set forth a low to moderate amount
($10,000 to $25,000 for any one victim and $10,000 to $50,000 for
all of the victims of any one accident) as the amount which an owner
of a motor vehicle must be able to pay to a victim. Why not require
the same amount of insurance for a person who chooses compensa-
tion insurance? If a state decides that $25,000 is the amount that a
responsible driver should be able to pay for injuring or killing an-
other person, that judgment ought not to change merely because the
mode of payment changes. Of course, the owner of a motor vehicle
should be able to buy excess limits coverage, regardless of whether
he or she chooses tort insurance or compensation insurance. The leg-
islature should determine how high those excess limits should be.
It seems unlikely that many states will follow the example of
Michigan and New Jersey and set required insurance limits high
65. The acronym AIS stands for the Abbreviated Injury Scale developed by the
American Association of Automotive Medicine.
66. "The average lifetime cost per person injured by a motor vehicle is $9,062. The
average cost ... for a hospitalized person, $43,409, and for a person injured but not
hospitalized, $1,570." "Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of injury death re-
sulting in 45,923 deaths in 1985. They also comprise the second leading cause of both
injury hospitalizations (523,028) and less severe, nonhospitalized injuries (4.8 million)."
D. RICE, E. MACKENZIE & Assoc., COST OF INJURY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT
TO CONGRESS 1989, at xxvii, 19 (1989).
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enough to pay for lifetime treatment of the catastrophically injured.
Much long-term medical and rehabilitation for the catastrophically
injured will probably continue to be financed under Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid. 67 The source of payment may not be a sig-
nificant issue of public policy if the more than 100 million Ameri-
cans who own motor vehicles prefer to have the care and treatment
of catastrophic motor vehicle accident victims paid for by the more
than 100 million Americans who pay Social Security taxes. Is it not
the citizens' right to decide which "pocket" should be used to pay for
particular expenditures?
C. Compensation Benefits for all Accident Victims?
It has been suggested that coverage for a limited amount of com-
pensation benefits for medical expenses should be a compulsory part
of the tort insurance alternative, as well as an integral part of the
compensation insurance alternative. This suggestion is inconsistent
with the rationale behind a choice system. Consumers should be al-
lowed to select for themselves which system they prefer and then to
add, on an optional basis, such other coverages as they want and can
afford. There is no real choice if the consumer is forced to buy com-
pensation insurance whether he or she chooses the tort system or the
compensation system. Adding compensation insurance benefits to the
tort insurance choice, and then allowing the motorist to choose be-
tween it and the compensation system, vitiates the choice concept.
There is no choice, in practice, if both of the alternatives are sub-
stantially the same.
67. Another way of financing care and treatment for the catastrophically injured
would be to create a special nonprofit fund authorized to receive the amount collected by
an increase in the federal tax on gasoline. Such a fund could be established to pay for the
medical and rehabilitation treatment and care of catastrophically injured auto accident
victims. Andrew Tobias proposed a mandatory no-fault system for all losses which would
be financed by adding auto insurance "premiums" to the cost of gasoline and which
would be managed by private insurance companies who would "bid" for the business. See
A. TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEVER
WANTED YOU TO KNOW (1982); Tobias, Fill 'Er Up With No-Fault, Please: A Solution
to the Auto Insurance Mess: Coverage by the Tankful, TIME, Feb. 27, 1989, at 52. The
idea of "pay at the pump no-fault" for all losses, however, would probably be opposed by
both trial lawyers and insurance companies, while a law creating a fund to provide medi-
cal and rehabilitation benefits, above a designated amount, to auto accident victims,
might be acceptable to both trial lawyers and insurance companies.
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D. Choice if Motorist Makes No Choice (Default Position)
If the owner of a motor vehicle does maintain auto insurance but
does not indicate whether he or she wants the liability (or un-
restricted lawsuit) alternative or the compensation (or no lawsuit)
alternative, which choice alternative shall he or she get? If a motor
vehicle owner ignores media barrages, insurance agent telephone
calls, and insurance company mailings, which alternative should he
or she be deemed to have selected? In 1986, Professor O'Connell and
I recommended that such a person be deemed to have selected liabil-
ity insurance because it is the traditional type of auto insurance. In
light of the pressure to lower insurance premiums, I have changed
my position. I now recommend that the default position be the alter-
native which the insurance commissioner says will offer the lowest
premium charges to consumers.
E. Agent/Broker Immunity?
Insurance agents and brokers might be sued for negligence in fail-
ing to advise their policyholder clients as to the best-for-them type of
insurance to buy in a state which permits motorists to choose. If they
are not protected from liability in such a circumstance, it is likely
that they would always recommend the traditional choice.
New Jersey has guarded against this danger with an enactment
that should be seriously considered by any state considering a choice
proposal:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no person, in-
cluding, but not limited to, an insurer, an insurance producer as de-
fined ... a servicing carrier or non-insurer servicing carrier acting in that
capacity pursuant to. . ., and the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance
Underwriting Association created pursuant to... shall be liable in an ac-
tion for damages on account of election of a tort option by a named insured
or on account of the tort option imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this
section [default position] or otherwise imposed by law. Nothing in this sub-
section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing damage as
the result of his willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or
omission.6
F. Residual Liability?
To what extent, if any, should a victim who is covered by a com-
pensation policy be permitted to sue a person whose alleged fault
caused the injury? Should a victim be permitted to sue an alleged
wrongdoer for economic loss sustained by the victim which is in ex-
cess of the benefits available under the victim's compensation insur-
ance policy? Or, should a victim who is covered by a compensation
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8.1.l.e (West 1989).
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policy be responsible for all of his or her economic losses so long as
they are less than the amount which the insurer was required to offer
to sell that person before he or she became a victim (the mandatory
offer)?
Professor O'Connell and I recommended that "a no-fault insured
[should be barred] from suing another motorist in tort to recover for
injuries suffered in an auto accident," except for intentional injuries
and other specific categories of malfeasance.6 9 That recommendation
has not, unfortunately, been followed in legislation enacted since
1986. The choice laws enacted in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the
choice bills passed by one legislative chamber in California, and the
bill introduced in Maryland70 permit a victim who is a compensation
insured to sue any alleged wrongdoer in tort if he or she suffers seri-
ous and permanent injury or death.
The allowance of claims and suits in tort for seriously injured vic-
tims is not cost-beneficial for such victims. Seriously injured victims
could generally obtain the same or a larger amount of money, if they
had bought added compensation insurance, including pain and suf-
fering insurance, than they would receive after a verdict or settle-
ment in a tort lawsuit, after deducting attorneys' fees and other col-
lection costs. The allowance of tort claims for the seriously injured
increases the cost of auto insurance for any prudent motorist who
owns real property. Any such motorist would, if such claims were
allowed, have to buy liability insurance to protect that property. The
annual premium could be substantial.
A person who selects the compensation policy alternative should
not be allowed to sue another person in tort for noneconomic dam-
ages,71 unless that other person intentionally caused the accident,
was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, or was the manufacturer, designer, or repairer of the motor
69. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 81.
70. E.g., Maryland H.R. 1434, 1989 Sess. (1989). The 1989 Maryland choice bill
was sharply criticized by HALT, a consumer law reform organization, for allowing some
victims to have both no-fault benefits and the right to bring a tort lawsuit.
Allowing drivers who select no-fault to sue and be sued at all keeps lawsuit
costs high enough to require either low benefits . . . or high premiums, or
both .... [T]o be safe, the prudent no-fault consumer must also purchase
liability insurance to protect themselves from lawsuits, thereby increasing their
total premiums.
D. Chalfie, Legislative Director of HALT Testimony before the Economic Matters Com-
mittee of the Maryland House of Delegates (Feb. 14, 1989).
71. Noneconomic damages means pain, suffering, inconvenience, and other intan-
gible loss.
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vehicle which caused the injury. A person who selects the compensa-
tion policy alternative should also not be allowed to sue another per-
son in tort for economic loss, in excess of amounts recovered under
the compensation policy or which would have been available under
the compensation policy, if the policyholder had purchased the full
amount of compensation coverage which insurers in that state were
required to offer for sale.72
H. Property Claims for Damage to Motor Vehicles
The question of whether to include motor vehicle property claims
in a choice system is a difficult one. It would probably not enable the
average motor vehicle owner to save much money on his or her in-
surance premiums, it would add complexity to an already compli-
cated system, and it might cause resentment on the part of motorists
who feel strongly that motorists who cause "fender benders" ought
to be sued.
Property damage could, from a technical point of view, be in-
cluded in a choice system. A motorist could be allowed to choose to
make his or her collision insurance policy the only mode of personal
redress in case of property damage following an auto accident. That
choice would give the motorist immunity from property damage
claims. A motorist could also be allowed to buy property damage
liability and inverse liability insurance, which would be his or her
only mode of redress in case of a property claim. The property liabil-
ity policy would pay any claim made against the motorist or a person
driving a car owned by the motorist (directly or via subrogation) for
damage caused to the motor vehicle of another by his or her negli-
gence. Such a policy would pay the claimant for any damage to his
or her own vehicle as a result of an accident, if the claimant could
establish that another person was at fault in causing that accident. A
motorist would be permitted, as at. present, to choose deductibles,
which would reduce the cost of insurance, and the motorist could
decline, as in most states today, to buy any property insurance.
L Dealing with the Multicar Household
Different members of many families may want different kinds of
motor vehicle insurance. Also, more and more American families
own more than one automobile. Should the owner of each motor ve-
hicle be the person who is authorized to decide whether to choose
tort insurance or compensation insurance, or should any person be
authorized to buy either kind of policy for himself? Should it matter,
72. This means the amount of compensation insurance which each insurer is re-
quired to offer to each insured.
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in a multicar household, whether the vehicles are insured by differ-
ent insurance companies?
I think the commissioner of insurance should have broad authority
over such questions. Minor children should be bound by the choice
made by their parents, or by the parent with whom they are residing
at the time of an accident. Teenagers who are minors but who are
eligible to drive under state law should be deemed to have chosen the
kind of insurance chosen by their parents, if their parents pay the
premiums on their insurance. Such teenagers should be authorized to
make their own choice if they own their own vehicle and pay their
own premiums.
J. Relating to Noncar Owners
What about pedestrians? Treatment of the motor vehicle owner
who is injured while he or she was a pedestrian will, like the rights
of members of a multicar household, have to be spelled out carefully
by the legislature. In my opinion, such a pedestrian should be com-
pensated under the terms of his or her own motor vehicle insurance
policy, if the pedestrian is a compensation insured. Conversely, such
a pedestrian should be free to sue the motor vehicle owner or opera-
tor involved, if the pedestrian is a tort insured.
The best way to treat pedestrians who are not covered by personal
motor vehicle insurance policies is probably to decree by statute that
they receive tort damages if the motor vehicle which struck them is
covered by tort insurance, and that they receive compensation bene-
fits if the motor vehicle which struck them is covered by compensa-
tion insurance.7"
K. Fairness
The relationship between the average basic premium that will be
charged for each alternative in a choice system should be fair and
honest and actuarially sound. The premium charged will be a very
important determinant in the making of insurance choice decisions.
The insurance choice which is cheaper, or which has a reputation
for being cheaper, will probably be the one that is selected by most
73. In our 1986 article, Professor O'Connell and I proposed that the uninsured
pedestrian be permitted to choose his or her mode of payment after an accident. "[Tihe
statute could provide that he be paid under the no-fault insured's coverage under either
no-fault or tort coverage, whichever the victim chooses." O'Connell & Joost, supra note
1, at 81 n.56.
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eligible motorists. Accordingly, it is very important that the available
choices not be "rigged" to result in an artificially low premium for
one of the choice alternatives. In this article, I discussed a California
bill that would have unfairly "tilted" the choice decision by requir-
ing that only one of the options be actuarially sound. A choice sys-
tem such as that should be rejected or reformed on the ground that
it is not fair.
In 1987, I drafted a choice bill for Delaware. It would have pro-
vided a minimum of $15,000/$30,000 in economic and noneconomic
damages for the victim/victims covered by a tort insurance policy
and up to $300,000 in economic loss damages for each victim cov-
ered by a compensation insurance policy. The draft bill was infor-
mally submitted to a leading insurer, prior to introduction, for an
estimated prediction as to average premium cost for each of the op-
tions. The insurer estimated that it would charge $149 for the liabil-
ity option and $150 for the compensation option. If the draft bill
had, however, provided a minimum of $15,000/$30,000 in economic
loss damages for the victim/victims covered by a compensation pol-
icy (i.e., the same amount as in the tort policy), the premium for the
compensation option would have been significantly lower than $150.
The bill as introduced was fair, in the sense that the premium cost of
the two options was approximately the same. But the bill as intro-
duced was not fair, in the sense that it required compensation in-
sureds to buy more coverage than they would have obtained if they
had chosen the tort option.
Does fairness, in the context of consumer choice in auto insurance,
mean that the premium for compensation insurance coverage should
be essentially the same as the premium for liability insurance cover-
age, or does it mean the consumer should be given a choice between
substantially equivalent coverages? I favor the latter position.
L. Understandability
A choice proposal must be understandable. This might be difficult,
but not impossible, if one of the findings of the focus groups referred
to above is accurate. The researchers for the groups concluded that
there are few people who understand the present system.
There was a basic misunderstanding of how the present system works. Peo-
ple seemed to feel that somehow insurance always comes through. They had
difficulty trying to collect from the at-fault driver or he went to court. It
was foreign to them to think that the injured person would be left with
unpaid medical bills in any circumstances. 4
So long as many people think tort insurance, the dominant type now,
always provides compensation, why would they be interested in hay-
74. Consumer Focus, supra note 26, at 2.
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ing an alternative to that system, unless the alternative promises to
decrease their premiums significantly? The "basic misunderstand-
ing" found by the focus group study suggests it is unlikely that many
citizens and legislators will ever really understand a proposal that
gives motorists an alternative to the present system as it really is. To
the extent possible, the legislatures and the government must be pre-
pared to help minimize that confusion and misunderstanding.
A choice-in-auto-insurance law should also be readable, in other
words, understandable to most policyholders. An advocate of "plain
English" once wrote that insurance policies "are notorious for using
endless, vastly complicated definitions of everything. If you have a
car or homeowners insurance policy handy, look at it. You'll find
that most of the coverage of the policy is buried in a definition of
'the insured' that runs for hundreds of words."' 75
IV. CONCLUSION
It is essentially more rational, more equitable, and more efficient
to allow individuals to choose for themselves whether to be compen-
sated quickly for their own economic losses and surrender their right
to recovery for noneconomic losses, in case of accident, or whether to
file a claim and sue another person for economic and noneconomic
losses.
Well over a quarter of a century ago, Professors Keeton and
O'Connell recommended an alternative compensation system for mo-
tor vehicle accident victims which was more rational, more efficient,
and more equitable.76 Experience, including several studies by the
United States Department of Transportation, has confirmed their
recommendations and their judgment. Their plan, however, was not
cost driven. They visualized a system which was better, but not less
costly, than the existing system. Today, any auto insurance reform
proposal must be cost driven: it must offer real hope of significant
premium reductions to those who find present automobile liability
insurance costs unaffordable or unacceptably high. That is why, in
the development of a choice system in 1986, Professor O'Connell and
75. R. FLESCH, How To WRITE PLAIN ENGLISH 63 (1979). Flesch developed a
readability formula and then applied it to various materials. On a scale of 100, he rated
consumer ads in magazines 82, Time magazine 52, the Harvard Law Review 32, and the
standard auto insurance policy 10. According to Flesch, one must be a college graduate
to understand material that scores zero to 30. Id. at 26.
76. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1964).
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I concluded that the best way to achieve acceptable premium cost
reductions would be to offer consumers a true choice between a basic
no-fault/compensation system and a basic tort/liability system.
It is my hope that this article illustrates the complexity of the is-
sues involved in reforming auto insurance law and shows the possi-
bility of achieving essentially similar objectives by markedly differ-
ent approaches.
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